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Dual Class Capitalization: 
A Reply to Professor Seligman 
George W. Dent, Jr.* 
Professor Joel Seligman's article, Equal Protection in Share-
holder Voting Rights: The One Common Share, One Vote Contro-
versy? is an impressive accomplishment in many respects. It 
confirms his status as premier historian of our securities laws and 
markets.2 It also provides a powerful analysis of, and the first se-
rious argument against, dual class capitalization, and proposes a 
thoughtful solution to the problems it raises. Despite these formi-
dable assets, some of Professor Seligman's conclusions are debata-
ble. First, Professor Seligman argues that the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) can impose on the National Associa-
tion of Securities Dealers (NASD) and the stock exchanges (col-
lectively, the "securities markets") rules forbidding dual class 
common stock among companies listed for trading. 3 Further, Pro-
Copyright© 1987 by George W. Dent, Jr. 
* Professor of Law, New York Law School. B.A. 1969, Columbia College; J.D. 
1973, Columbia; LL.M. 1981, New York University. I gratefully acknowledge the 
helpful comments of Arthur Best, James Brook, Roberta Karmel, Louis Lowenstein, 
and David Schoenbrod. All errors, of course, are mine. 
1. Seligman, Equal Protection in Shareholder Voting Rights: The One Common 
Share, One Vote Controversy, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 687 (1986). 
2. His status was established in J. SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL 
STREET: A HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN 
CORPORATE FINANCE (1982), and confirmed in J. SELIGMAN, THE SEC AND THE Fu-
TURE OF FINANCE (1985); Seligman, The Future of the National Market System, 10 J. 
CoRP. L. 79 (1984); Seligman, The Structure of the Options Markets, 10 J. CORP. L. 141 
(1984); and Seligman, The Historical Need for a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure Sys-
tem, 9 J. CORP. L. 1 (1983) [hereinafter Seligman, Mandatory Disclosure]. 
3. Seligman, supra note 1, at 714-19. 
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fessor Seligman argues that such rules would be wise. 4 
This Reply argues that both his positions are ill-founded. Part I 
analyzes the SEC's power to forbid dual class capitalization. Part 
II discusses the concept of efficiency in corporate law and proce-
dural safeguards to limit dual class capitalization to situations in 
which it is efficient. It further provides a theoretical discussion of 
the efficiency of dual class capitalization. Part III advances a 
counterproposal to Professor Seligman's position, as well as that 
of Professor Daniel Fischel. Although Professor Seligman is right 
that dual class capitalization creates dangers, new legislation can 
allow such capitalization, yet protect against these dangers. Un-
like his proposed prohibition, this new legislation should permit 
dual class stock if it will not injure public shareholders. 
I. The SEC's Power to Forbid Dual Class Capitalization 
Dual class capitalization (or dual class stock) refers to shares of 
common stock with different voting rights. This usually entails 
the issue of separate classes of stock with disproportionate voting 
rights, but may also arise through rules affecting the voting rights 
of shares of a single class.5 As Professor Seligman accurately ex-
plains, dual class stock has been extremely rare among public 
companies since the late 1920s.6 In the last few years, however, 
several companies have adopted dual class stock, apparently in 
most cases as a takeover defense. 7 Many more will undoubtedly 
do so if stock exchange rules prohibiting it are lifted. 8 
Professor Seligman argues that the SEC can require the stock 
exchanges and the N ASD to forbid dual class capitalization among 
companies registered under section 12 of the Securities Exchange 
Act.9 He finds authority in section 19(c) of the Exchange Act,l0 
which empowers the SEC to impose rules that it "deems necessary 
or appropriate to insure the fair administration of the self-regula-
tory organization, to conform its rules to requirements of this 
chapter and the rules and regulations thereunder applicable to 
such organizations, or otherwise in furtherance of the purposes of 
this chapter." Section 19(c), like any other statute, only autho-
rizes the SEC "to police within the boundaries of the Act" but not 
"to expand its jurisdiction beyond the boundaries established by 
4. Id. at 720-24. 
5. For a discussion of the ways in which dual class stock can be adopted, see 
infra text accompanying notes 111-41. 
6. Seligman, supra note 1, at 693-707. 
7. ld. at 701-03. Although on occasion takeover defense is clearly not the goal of 
a company's use of dual class stock, see infra note 123, often it is the goal, see infra. 
text accompanying notes 142-45. 
8. Seligman, supra note 1, at 701-03. The directors of the New York Stock Ex-
change have now voted to rescind its rule. See infra note 39. 
9. Seligman, supra note 1, at 714; see also Karmel, The SEC's Power to Regulate 
Stockholder Voting Rights, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 21, 1986, at 1, col. 1, at 2, col. 4 [hereinafter 
Karmel, SEC's Power to Regulate] (also arguing that the SEC has such power). 
10. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c) (1982). 
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Congress."11 The legislative history states that this section gives 
the SEC "plenary power over self-regulatory rules" and "the 
power to change the rules of a self-regulatory organization in any 
respect, not just with respect to certain enumerated areas."12 Pro-
fessor Seligman claims that three "purposes of this title" would be 
furthered by the rule he proposes,l3 One is the goal of neutrality 
in tender offers arguably contained within the Williams Act.14 
The second is the SEC's authority to "designate the securities or 
classes of securities qualified for trading in the national market" 
under section 11A(a)(2) of the Exchange Act.15 The third is the 
commission's power to regulate the solicitation of proxies.16 
Professor Seligman's reading of the SEC's statutory powers is 
far from compelling. He relies on such vague statements as "in 
furtherance of the purposes of this title" in section 19(c) and "ple-
nary power over self-regulatory rules" in the legislative historyP 
In the last decade, however, the Supreme Court has often ruled 
that administrative agencies may act only under specific, well-
defined grants of power. Neither pursuit of the public interest nor 
the ''broad purpose" of a statute can support a rule not justified by 
the statutory language; if the statute is inadequate, Congress, 
rather than the agency, must correct the flaw.18 An agency's in-
terpretation of the statute it administers warrants judicial defer-
ence, but deference "cannot be allowed td slip into a judicial 
inertia which results in the unauthorized assumption ... of major 
policy decisions properly made by Congress."19 Careful judicial 
review thus extends both to an agency's rulemaking and to adjudi-
11. Board of Governors v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 106 S. Ct. 681, 688 n.6 (1986) (re-
ferring to the powers of the Federal Reserve Board). 
12. S. REP. No. 75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 131, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CoDE CONG. & 
ADMIN. NEWS 179, 308. The broad terms "plenary power" and "in any respect" must, 
however, be read in light of the language of both section 19(c) itself, which permits 
rulemaking for certain enumerated purposes "or otherwise in furtherance of this ti-
tle," and of the legislative history, which refers to rules "consistent with the objec-
tives of the Exchange Act" or "in furtherance of the purposes of the Exchange Act." 
ld. at 31, 131, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 179, 209, 308. 
13. Seligman, supra note 1, at 714-19. 
14. Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 
78n(d)-(f) (1982)). 
15. 15 U.S.C. § 78k-1(a)(2) (1982). 
16. Seligman, supra note 1, at 717-19. 
17. ld. at 715. 
18. Board of Governors v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 106 S. Ct. 681, 689 (1986) (stating 
that the Federal Reserve Board cannot rely on the " 'broad purposes' of legislation at 
the expense of specific provisions"; Congress must correct any statutory flaws); 
NAACP v. Federal Power Comm'n, 425 U.S. 662, 669 (1976) (stating that the statutory 
standard of the " 'public interest' . . . is not a broad license to promote the general 
public welfare. Rather, the words take meaning from the purposes of the regulatory 
legislation"). 
19. NLRB v. Financial Inst. Employees, 106 S. Ct. 1007, 1013 (1986) (quoting 
American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 318 (1965)); see Securities Indus. 
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catory interpretation of a statute.20 
Although the Supreme Court has never invalidated an SEC 
rule, it has often overruled the SEC's construction of federal se-
curities statutes and of the SEC's own rules, especially rule lOb-5, 
on grounds that broader constructions would exceed the commis-
sion's rulemaking authority.21 As the Court stated in Ernst & 
Ernst v. Hochfelder: 22 "The rulemaking power granted to an ad-
ministrative agency charged with the administration of a federal 
statute is not the power to make law. Rather, it is' "the power to 
adopt regulations to carry into effect. the will of Congress as ex-
pressed by the statute."' "23 Such decisions show that the SEC's 
rulemaking power will be carefully scrutinized by the courts. 
On close analysis, the specific purposes of the securities laws 
claimed by Professor Seligman do not exist, at least not in the 
form he ascribes to them. Citing Professor John Coffee, he argues 
that dual class stock defies the Williams Act's goal of neJ.Itrality in 
tender offers24 - but the meaning of neutrality in this context is 
highly problematic.25 Congress intended the Williams Act primar-
Ass'n v. Board of Governors, 468 U.S. 137, 142-43 (1984) (stating that "deference is not 
to be a device that emasculates the significance of judicial review"). 
20. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors, 468 U.S. 137, 142-43 (1984). 
21. The cases narrowing rule 10b-5 include: Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983) 
(requiring the breach of an insider's fiduciary duty before a tippee inherits the duty to 
disclose or abstain); Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980) (requiring scienter in an SEC 
suit); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (holding that mere possession of 
nonpublic information does not give rise to a duty to disclose); Santa Fe Indus. v. 
Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (holding that only conduct involving deception or manipu-
lation was reached by rule 10b-5); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) 
(requiring scienter in private actions); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 
U.S. 723 (1975) (holding that a rule 10b-5 plaintiff must be a purchaser or seller of 
securities). Other cases rejecting the SEC's broad interpretations of the federal secur-
ities laws include: Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2458 (1985) (re-
jecting broader definition of "manipulative"); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. 
Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979) (rejecting the SEC's definition of "security"); SEC v. 
Sloan, 436 U.S. 103 (1978) (rejecting the SEC's broad interpretation of its power to 
suspend trading in a security); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1 (1977) (discuss-
ing takeover bidder's standing to sue under the Williams Act); United Hous. Found., 
Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975) (holding that a tenant's stock in a housing coopera-
tive is not a security for purposes of the securities laws). For a list of other Supreme 
Court rejections of the SEC's interpretations, see International Bhd. of Teamsters, 439 
U.S. at 566 n.20. 
22. 425 u.s. 185 (1976). 
23. Id. at 213-14 (quoting Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68, 74 (1965) (quoting 
Manhattan Gen. Equip. Co. v. Commissioner, 297 U.S. 129, 134 (1936))). 
24. Seligman, supra note 1, at 717 (citing Coffee, Regulating the Market for Corpo-
rate Control: A Critical Assessment of the Tender Offe?·'s Role in Corporate Govern-
ance, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1266-67 (1984) ). 
25. Congress often proclaimed a goal of neutrality in tender offers when passing 
the Williams Act. See Hearings on S.510 Before the Subcomm. on Secu·rities of the 
Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st S{;!ss. 178 (1967) (statement 
of Milton Cohen, Chairman, SEC) ("[W]e are not concerned with assisting or hurting 
either side."); S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1967) (stating that the purpose 
of the law was to "place investors on an equal footing with the takeover bidder" with-
out favoring either the tender offeror or existing management); 113 CONG. REc. 24,664 
(1967) (statement of Sen. Williams) ("We have taken extreme care to avoid tipping 
the scales either in favor of management or in favor of the person malting the take-
over bids."); see also Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 29-31 (1977) (emphasizing 
that neutrality between takeover bidder and management was intended to benefit the 
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ily to regulate tender offerors (raiders).26 Companies subject to 
tender offers (targets) were regulated only as to disclosure and 
purchases of their own shares.27 Moreover, section 14(e) applies 
only "in connection with any tender offer"; it does not apply un-
less a tender offer is actually pending.28 Thus, the commission 
could not use section 14(e) to attack dual class stock except insofar 
as it entails material misrepresentation or nondisclosure during a 
tender offer. No other provision of the Williams Act provides bet-
ter support.29 
The Williams Act analysis collapses when pushed to its logical 
conclusion- if it is right, the SEC can prohibit, as a violation of 
neutrality, all takeover defenses, including staggered boards of di-
rectors, poison pill preferred stock, fair price charter provisions, 
golden parachutes, and perhaps even defensive mergers and the 
creation of employee stock option plans. Nothing in the legislative 
history suggests that Congress intended to grant such power. Fur-
thermore, Professor Seligman's analysis of the Williams Act can 
apply only if dual class capitalization is adopted to hinder take-
overs. But dual class stock is often adopted when management 
already owns a majority of the stock.30 Because such companies 
investors); Coffee, Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical Assess-
ment of the Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 
1267 n.369 (discussing Congress's purpose in its policy of neutrality). 
26. 113 CONG. REC. 857-58 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Kuchel, cosponsor of the Wil-
liams Act, criticizing corporate raiders, whom he described as "takeover pirates"); see 
Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 28, 30, 37 (1977) (stating that raider is not an 
"intended beneficiary of the Williams Act" but "a member of the class whose activi-
ties Congress intended to regulate"). 
27. See infra note 29. Thus, the Supreme Court, in Schreiber v. Burlington 
Northern, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2458 (1985), held that section 14(e)- the general antifraud 
provision of the Act - forbids only misrepresentation and nondisclosure, and not acts 
by target managements that are simply unfair to their shareholders. Id. at 2462-65. 
28. Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F-,6!d 271, 283-84 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 
U.S. 1092 (1981); Lewis v. McGraw, 619 F.2d 192, 195 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 
951 (1980); see T. HAzEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 382-83 & n.36 (1985) 
(discussing Panter v. Marshall Field & Co.). According to the legislative history, the 
purpose of section 14(e) is to place those making or resisting a tender offer "under an 
obligation to make full disclosure of material information to those with whom they 
deal." H.R. REP. No.1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.11, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. 
& ADMIN. NEWS 2811, 2821. 
29. Section 13(d) only requires disclosures by raiders or potential raiders; it does 
not even apply to target managements. See Warner Communications, Inc. v. Mur-
doch, 581 F. Supp. 1482, 1501 (D. Del. 1984). If management pools efforts with third 
parties, however, the group must comply with section 13(d). Id. at 1499-1500; T. 
HAzEN, supra note 28, at 344 n.27. Section 14(d) does require certain disclosures by 
target managements, but its substantive requirements apply only to raiders. 
30. As Professor Seligman notes, one study demonstrated that managers of com-
Panies adopting dual class stock already owned an average of 48.6% of the stock. Se-
ligman, supra note 1, at 711 n.107. Many of these managers are obviously not 
threatened by takeovers. 
1986] 729 
are not subject to hostile takeovers, his reasoning could not logi-
cally apply to them. 
Professor Seligman also cites the SEC's power under section 
11A(a)(2) of the Exchange Act to "designate the securities or 
classes of securities qualified for trading in the national market 
system."31 However, he and Milton Cohen, a former SEC official 
whom he quotes with approval, admit that the issue "is not free 
from doubt."32 They could proclaim that this power knows no lim-
its - that the SEC can impose on public companies any corporate 
governance rules it fancies. In fact, the SEC virtually made this 
claim during the 1970s when Chairman Harold Williams declared 
that the commission could require listed companies to remove all 
inside directors except the chief executive officer (who would not 
be the chairman of the board) and to create certain overview com-
mittees.33 Wisely, Professor Seligman eschews this argument; he 
concedes that the SEC cannot "establish ... a comprehensive fed-
eral corporation act."34 The legislative history of the securities 
laws contains no hint that Congress intended to grant the SEC 
such power,35 and Supreme Court decisions deny the SEC such 
power.36 Moreover, if Congress had intended to grant such power, 
serious constitutional questions would arise.37 
Professor Seligman must therefore steer between Scylla and 
Charybdis - he must define the commission's power broadly 
enough to encompass the rules he proposes, yet narrowly enough 
to avoid charges of unconstitutionality and lack of authority. In a 
search for limits, he argues that his proposal may be justified "to 
assure the equal regulation of all markets for qualified securi-
ties."38 This argument collapses when, as now, the New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE) has voted to rescind its rule against dual 
class stock.39 Moreover, "equal regulation" is defined solely in 
31. I d. at 715-16; see also Kannel, SEC's Power to Regulate, supra note 9, at 2, col. 3 
(making a similar argument). 
32. Letter from Milton Cohen to John P. Wheeler, III, Secretary, Securities and 
Exchange Commission (Feb. 8, 1985) [hereinafter Letter to Wheeler] (regarding File 
S7-37-84, Release No. 34-21498, at 20-21), quoted in Seligman, supra note 1, at 716. 
33. H. Williams, Corporate Accountability and Corporate Power (Oct. 24, 1979) (a 
paper presented in the Fairless Lecture Series, Carnegie-Mellon University), de-
scribed in Kripke, The SEC, Corporate Governance, and the Real Issues, 36 Bus. LAw. 
173, 178 (1981). 
34. Seligman, supra note 1, at 715. 
35. The Senate Report on the Exchange Act stresses that it was not intended "to 
invest a governmental commisslon with the power to interfere in the management of 
corporations." S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1934). The House-Senate con-
ference omitted a clause that expressly forbade "the Commission to interfere with the 
management of the affairs of an issuer" because it was "unnecessary, since it is not 
believed that the bill is open to misconstruction in this respect." H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 
1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1934); see Dent, Ancillary Relief in Federal Securities 
Law: A Study in Federal Remedies, 67 MINN. L. REV. 865, 903-09 (1983) [hereinafter 
Dent, Ancillary ReliEd']. 
36. See infra text accompanying notes 73-78. 
37. See infra text accompanying note 82. 
38. Seligman, supra note 1, at 715 (quoting S. REP. No. 75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 
105, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 179, 282). 
39. See NYSE Press Release, New York Stock Exchange Directors Approve 
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terms of regulation under the Exchange Act, not by self-regula-
tory organizations.40 Because the SEC does not forbid dual class 
stock in any market, its regulation here is not unequal. 
Does the NASD, by permitting dual class stock, deny "fair com-
petition ... among exchange markets" within the meaning of sec-
tion 11A(a)(1)(C)(ii)?41 In 1975, Congress decried certain 
noncompetitive practices, such as the off-board trading restric-
tions of the NYSE, as obstacles to "economically efficient execu-
tion of securities transactions."42 The means Congress chose to 
solve this problem was the creation of a national market system. 
Congress charged the SEC to "facilitate the establishment" of 
such a system43 and to remove obstacles to it, and the commission 
has since done so.44 But dual class stock creates no such obstacle 
because, whatever its faults, it does not impair the "economically 
efficient execution of securities transactions" or the establishment 
of a national market system. Moreover, complaints about the un-
fairness of dual class stock have issued mostly from the NYSE, 
which Congress viewed as dominating the securities exchange 
markets. 45 By prohibiting dual class stock, the SEC would be en-
hancing competition less than protecting the NYSE from competi-
Amendment to Allow Dual Classes of Common Stock for Listed Companies (July 3, 
1986); Sterngold, Big Board Ends Equal Vote Rule, N.Y. Times, July 4, 1986, at D1, col. 
1. 
40. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 3(a}(36), 15 U.S.C. § 78(c)(a)(36) (1982). 
41. 15 U.S.C. § 78k-1(a)(1)(C)(ii) (1982). Professor Seligman quotes Milton Co-
hen's statement that dual class stock produces "a serious form of discrimination 
among issuers, such as to result in unfair competition." Letter to Wheeler, supra note 
32, quoted in Seligman, supra note 1, at 716. 
42. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 11A(a}(1}(C)(i), 15 U.S.C. § 78k-1(a} 
(1)(C)(i) (1982). The rule, then identified as NYSE Rule 394, received harsh criticism 
from Congress in 1975. See S. REP. No. 75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 8, reprinted in 1975 
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 179, 185-86; R. JENNINGS & H. MARsH, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON SECURITIES REGULATION 463, 489 (5th ed. 1982). Barriers to competi-
tion among securities markets were part of Congress's concern. See 15 U.S,C. § 78k-
1(a)(1}(C)(ii) (1982) ("fair competition ... among exchange markets"); id. § 78k-
1(a}(1)(D) ("enhance competition"); id. § 78k-1(c)(4)(A) (''burden on competition"). 
43. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 11A(a}(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78k-l(a}(2) (1982). 
44. Rules 19c-1 and 19c-3 substantially eliminate off-board trading restrictions. 17 
C.F.R. § 240.19c-1, .19c-3 (1986). 
45. See Coming to Blows Over One Share, One Vote, Bus. WK., July 8, 1985, at 81-
82 (NYSE Chairman John Phelan stated that the NYSE will continue to forbid dual 
class stock "only if 'competing markets' follow suit."). On Congress's hostility to the 
NYSE, seeS. REP. No. 75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 20, 62-65 (criticizing NYSE's Rule 394 
and limited membership policy), reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 
179, 198-99, 240-44; H.R. REP. No. 123, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 47, 52-54 (1975) (criticizing 
NYSE's limited membership and fixed commission policies and "boycotts such as" 
NYSE Rule 394); 121 CONG. REc. 10,731 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Williams) C'Tf]he 
Principal stock exchanges ... have resisted modernization."); 119 CONG. REC. 20,034 
(1973) (remarks of Sen. Williams) (criticizing securities markets "run by a few for a 
few"); id. at 20,039 (remarks of Sen. Tower) (criticizing "the present distorted pricing 
system and increasingly privately oriented exchange network"). 
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-tion.46 This does not mean that the SEC must sit by helplessly if 
competition forces the securities markets to the lowest common 
denominator.47 The SEC may act, but only to preserve fair and 
orderly markets that are financially sound and free of manipula. 
tion and deception.48 Dual class capitalization, however, does not 
infringe upon any of these legitimate concerns. 
The primary reason for rejecting Professor Seligman's reading 
of section 11A(a)(2), however, is the statutory language itself. 
That section authorizes the SEC to designate securities qualified 
for trading "in the national market system."49 At most, this 
means that the SEC can exclude securities from this system.so 
First, excluding companies with dual class stock would carry little 
clout. If these companies remained listed on the NASD auto. 
mated quotation system (NASDAQ), the American Stock Ex. 
change (AMEX) or the NYSE, their stock prices would not suffer. 
Section 11A(a)(2) cannot justify exclusion from trading in these 
markets, which are not the national market system but comp0 • 
nents of the fragmented trading network that Congress wanted to 
reform.51 Moreover, Congress sought the creation of a national 
market system not to regulate the governance of public compa. 
nies, but to assure execution of trades at the best available price.s2 
Professor Seligman's proposal would be irrelevant, if not contrary, 
to this purpose. 
What, then, is the meaning of the SEC's power to "designate the 
46. Congress did not consider uniformity synonymous with competition. "It 
would obviously be contrary to this purpose [to enhance competition] to compel elimi-
nation of differences between types of markets or types of forms that might be compe-
tition enhancing." S. REP. No. 75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 8, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE 
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 179, 186. 
47. Of course, rule changes in the securities exchange markets resulting from 
competition are not necessarily detrimental. However, the argument of Professor Fis-
chel that competition among the securities markets will necessarily lead to optimal 
rules, see D. FISCHEL, ORGANIZED EXCHANGES AND THE REGULATION OF DUAL CLASS 
COMMON STOCK 7-17 (1986), is not valid. See infra text accompanying notes 125-32. 
48. These goals are consistent with the purposes of the Exchange Act, which the 
SEC may further under section 19(c) by imposing rules on the exchanges and the 
NASD. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1982) ("fair and 
honest markets"); § 6(b)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(5) ("free and open market"); 
§ 6(c)(3)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(c)(3)(A) ("financial responsibility"); § 7(a), 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78g(a) ("preventing the excessive use of credit"); § 8, 15 U.S.C. § 78h (restricting 
borrowing by broker-dealers);§ 9, 15 U.S.C. § 78i (prohibiting manipulation on securi-
ties exchanges); § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (prohibiting manipulation and deception); § 11, 15 
U.S.C. § 78k (limiting trading by exchange members for their own account); 
§ 15(b)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4) (SEC discipline of broker-dealers); § 15(c)(1), 15 
U.S.C. § 78o (c)(1) (prohibiting manipulation or deception by broker-dealers); 
§ 15A(b)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(6) (prevention of fraud by securities association 
members); § 15A(g)(3)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(g)(3)(A) (broker-dealer financial 
responsibility). 
49. 15 U.S.C. § 78k-1(a)(2) (1982). 
50. See Karmel, Is One Share, One Vote Archaic?, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 26, 1985, at 1, col. 
1, at 2, col. 4 [hereinafter Karmel, One Share, One Vote]. 
51. "[T]he national market system has as its fundamental goal the elimination of 
fragmented markets for securities .... " S. REP. No. 75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 17, re-
printed in 1975 U.S. CODE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 179, 195. 
52. See id. at 3, 7, 9-12, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 179, 
181-82, 185, 187-91. 
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securities or classes of securities qualified for trading in the na-
tional market system"? The SEC itself has aptly answered the 
question: "[T]he types of securities qualified to be included in the 
national market system ... should depend primarily on their char-
acteristics (e.g., trading volume, price and numbers of sharehold-
ers) .... "53 The Commission has adopted rules reflecting this 
view.54 Indeed, in 1975, the Conference Committee stated that "it 
is the intention of both houses that all securities, other than ex-
empted securities, be eligible to be qualified for trading in the na-
tional market system."55 Thus, Professor Seligman's proposed 
rule would, by disqualifying securities for trading, pervert the in-
tention of Congress, especially because the reasons for disqualifi-
cation would be extraneous to sound trading. 
Professor Seligman also argues that the SEC may use its power 
to regulate proxies to forbid dual class capitalization because it im-
pairs "the free exercise of the voting rights of stockholders."56 
The SEC's power to regulate proxies is limited, however, primar-
ily to requiring full disclosure in proxy situations; the abuse Con-
gress condemned was primarily the retention of control "by 
concealing or distorting facts. "57 This power may extend slightly 
further. For example, the Commission has required that proxy 
cards include spaces not only to vote for or against a proposal, but 
also to abstain. 58 Although many consider these rules silly, no one 
considers them beyond the Commission's power. I have argued 
elsewhere that the Commission cannot require inclusion of share-
holder proposals in proxy statements,59 but at least shareholder 
proposals concern the content of the proxy statement and matters 
to be voted upon by shareholders. By contrast, Professor Selig-
man's proposed rule deals not at all with proxies, but with a form 
of capitalization that might indirectly impair to some extent a 
53. Notice of Intent to Commence Rulemaking to Establish a National Market 
System, Exchange Act Release No. 14,416, [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
(CCH) ~ 81,502, at 80,028 (Jan. 26, 1978). 
54. SEC Rule 11Aa2-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.11Aa2-1 (1986). 
55. H.R. REP. No. 249, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 92 (1975). 
56. Seligman, supra note 1, at 717 (quoting J .I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431 
(1964)). 
57. S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 77 (1934); see Dent, SEC Rule 14a-8: A 
Study in Regulatory Failure, 30 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1, 22-23 (1985) e [hereinafter 
Dent, Regulatory Failure]. The concept of disclosure is broad for this purpose. It 
includes, for example, strict limits on discretionary proxies. SEC Rule 14a-4(c), 17 
C.F.R. § 240.4a-14(c) (1986). This is simply consistent with the requirement of full 
disclosure about matters on which shareholders are asked to vote. 
58. SEC Rule 14a-4(b)(l), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(b)(l) (1985). Professor Homer 
Kripke has criticized this rule. Kripke, supra note 33, at 176 n.14. 
59. Dent, Regulatory Failure, supra note 57, at 6-28. 
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mythical system of shareholder democracy.60 It is doubtful that 
most securities law experts would accept so broad a definition of 
the proxy regulation power. 
Professor Seligman argues that section 14( a) was intended to 
prevent "the recurrence of abuses which have frustrated the free 
exercise of voting rights of shareholders,"61 and that "Congress 
presumably must have viewed nonvoting common stock or com-
mon stock with disproportionate voting rights as exactly such an 
abuse."62 He cites no authority for the latter proposition in the 
Act's legislative history, however, even though dual class stock 
was not unknown in 1934.63 Indeed, Congress expressly forbade 
dual class stock to certain companies in the Public Utility Holding 
Company Act and the Investment Company Act.64 If Congress did 
consider dual class stock an abuse, the proxy rules were a strange 
weapon with which to attack it, and Congress certainly hid its in-
tentions very well. Moreover, as with his discussion of section 
11A(a)(2), even if Professor Seligman is correct in construing the 
proxy regulation power so broadly, his position would raise serious 
constitutional questions. 65 
Ironically, Professor Seligman's proposal is schizophrenic; he 
champions corporate democracy but would advance it by denying 
shareholders the franchise to approve dual class stock. 66 By con-
trast, the NYSE would permit dual class stock if approved by a 
majority of a company's shareholders.67 Moreover, Professor 
Seligman opposes dual class capitalization even if shareholders ob-
tain sweeteners so that the value of their shares does not then de-
cline.68 Who then suffers? Apparently, he properly limits his 
concern to shareholders.69 If shareholders suffer no immediate 
loss, his concern must be future shareholders' welfare. But posit-
ing a delayed stock price reaction seems to conflict with principles 
60. "There has long been a consensus that this goal [of shareholder democracy] is 
not practicable." Kripke, supra note 33, at 176; see authorities cited in id. at 176 n.13. 
61. Seligman, supra note 1, at 719 (quoting H.R. REP. No.1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 
14 (1934)). 
62. Id. 
63. As Professor Seligman indicates, the NYSE accepted nonvoting common stock 
until 1926. In 1934, it still listed previously accepted nonvoting issues, voting trust 
certificates, and disproportionate voting shares. Id. at 697-99. Congress did not pro-
hibit any of these. 
64. Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, § ll(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 79k(b)(2) 
(1982); Investment Company Act of 1940, § 18(i), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18(i) (1982); see also 
11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(6) (1982) (plan of reorganization in bankruptcy may not provide 
for nonvoting stock and must provide for "an appropriate distribution" of voting 
power among classes of equity securities). 
65. See infra text accompanying note 82. 
66. See Seligman, supra note 1, at 717-18 (referring to "corporate suffrage" and 
"'corporate democracy'"). This inconsistency about shareholder competence is not 
unique; Professor Kripke has noticed the SEC's tendency to question shareholder 
competence in casting votes. Kripke, supra note 33, at 176 n.14. 
67. See NYSE Press Release, supra note 39, Sterngold, supra note 39, at D3, col. 4. 
68. Seligman, supra note 1, at 723 ("[I]f the basic economic effect of dual class 
voting structures is a loss in management efficiency, a payment to shareholders will 
not compensate society for that economic cost."). 
69. See infra text accompanying notes 103-05. 
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of stock market behavior embodied in the efficient market hy-
pothesis.70 The skepticism about shareholder suffrage implicit in 
Professor Seligman's proposal may be well-founded; his own sta-
tistics on proxy fights justify suspicion.71 But Professor Seligman 
cannot have it both ways; if he wants shareholder suffrage he 
must accept its consequences, including approval of dual class 
capitalization. 
Professor Seligman's analysis ignores another major problem -
the rule he proposes would invade an area generally governed by 
state law and displace laws of most states, which permit dual class 
capitalization.72 In cases like Burks v. Lasker73 and Santa Fe In-
dustries v. Green, 74 the Supreme Court has held that corporate 
governance will be regulated by state law absent "a clear indica-
tion of congressional intent, ... particularly where established 
state policies of corporate regulation would be overridden."75 The 
Court's concern is consistent with the legislative history of these-
curities laws, which shows that Congress intended to leave corpo-
rate governance generally to the states.76 Thus, "absent repealing 
or exclusivity provisions, [state law] should be preempted by ex-
change self-regulation 'only to the extent necessary to protect the 
achievement of the aims of the Securities Exchange Act.' "77 
These decisions are but part of a growing concern for federalism 
that has influenced the Court in several areas.78 Professor Selig-
man concedes that the SEC cannot preempt state corporate laws 
70. See infra text accompanying notes 117-22. 
71. See Seligman, supra note 1, at 710. 
72. Professor Seligman notes that a few state court decisions have barred the issu-
ance of superior voting stock during a contest for control, and that the securities ad-
ministrators of 18 states forbid public offerings by issuers with dual class stock. 
Seligman, supra note 1, at 712-14. However, the former situation is special and should 
be handled separately. Compare the situations described infra in text accompanying 
notes 112-24. The 18 states are not only a minority of the whole, but are also a minor-
ity of the important commercial states. Even if they were a majority, that would not 
justify the SEC in preempting the laws of the minority. Some states are now consid-
ering mandating disproportionate voting rights. See infra note 141. 
73. 441 u.s. 471 (1979). 
74. 430 u.s. 462 (1977). 
75. Id. at 479; see Burks, 441 U.S. at 477-80 (maintaining that state law is the pri-
mary authority with respect to the powers of corporate directors). The Court also 
stated that "except where federal law expressly requires certain responsibilities of 
directors with respect to stockholders, state law will govern the internal affairs of the 
corporation." Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 479 (quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975)). 
76. See Dent, Ancillary Relief, supra note 35, at 913-16. 
77. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Ware, 414 U.S.l17, 127 (1973) (hold-
ing that stock exchange rules did not preempt state employment law) (quoting Silver 
v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 361 (1963)). 
78. See Employees of Dep't of Pub. Health and Welfare v. Department of Pub. 
Health and Welfare, 411 U.S. 279 (1973) (declaring unconstitutional federal legislation 
that infringed upon state interests); Goldstein, A Swann Song for Remedies: Equita-
ble Relief in the Burger Court, 13 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 8-26 (1978) (discussing 
the growing consideration of federalism in fashioning constitutional remedies). 
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without express authority,79 yet his proposal would do precisely 
that. Indeed, his proposal is more troublesome than the positions 
rejected in Burks and Santa Fe because it would preempt express 
state laws.80 Although Professor Seligman adds that the SEC can 
preempt state law when it can demonstrate that the action is "nec-
essary,"81 he never explains what "necessary" means in this 
context. 
Even if Professor Seligman could prove that the SEC's authority 
is broad enough to bar dual class capitalization, he would only suc-
ceed in leaping out of the statutory pan and into a constitutional 
fire. His argument succeeds only if the SEC has virtually unlim-
ited authority to bar corporate governance mechanisms it dislikes, 
even overthrowing state corporation laws in the process. But such 
power would be an unconstitutional delegation of legislative au-
thority. As Professor David Schoenbrod has shown, the Supreme 
Court has recently appeared uneasy over the permissive delega-
tion doctrine and may be seeking to give the doctrine some sub-
stcuJ.ce.82 If adopted, Professor Seligman's proposed rule would be 
a prime candidate for invalidation on delegation grounds. In any 
event, the Court may well construe the Exchange Act narrowly to 
avoid the delegation issue. 83 
A somewhat different question has arisen now that the SEC has 
been asked not to forbid dual class stock but to approve repeal of 
the NYSE's rule against dual class stock. Under section 19(b), the 
Commission must approve a rule change only if it "is consistent 
with the requirements of" the Exchange Act and its rules. This 
language resembles the comparable language of section 19(c);84 re-
peal would be consistent with the Exchange Act for the reasons 
discussed above with respect to section 19(c). Moreover, some of 
Professor Seligman's arguments for a comprehensive prohibition 
against dual class stock would support repeal of the NYSE rule. 
For example, the arguments for equal regulation and against un-
fair competition among exchange markets85 suggest that the 
NYSE should not have to sustain a rule not borne by the other 
securities markets. 
I recognize the need to limit use of dual class stock.86 Nonethe-
less, the SEC currently lacks authority to impose substantive limi-
tations, at least in the form proposed by Professor Seligman. New 
79. Seligman, supra note 1, at 715. 
80. As Professor Seligman recognizes, many state statutes expressly permit mul-
tiple classes of common stock. Seligman, supra note 1, at 712-13. In Burks and Santa 
Fe, the state law in question, if there was any, was mostly judge-made because in 
many states there was no statute on the issues in question (litigation committees in 
Burks and freeze-outs in Santa Fe). 
81. See Seligman, supra note 1, at 715. 
82. Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine: Could the Court Give It Substance?, 83 
MICH. L. REV. 1223, 1226 & n.15 (1985). 
83. See id. at 1271-75. 
84. Section 19(c) is quoted in pertinent part at supra text accompanying note 11. 
85. See supra text accompanying notes 38-52. 
86. See infra text accompanying notes 136-52 & 189-97. 
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legislation is therefore required if limitations are to be imposed.87 
IL The Desirability of Dual Class Capitalization 
Professor Seligman cites economists' studies showing that, in 
cases of dual class capitalization, the stock with inferior voting 
rights commands a lower market price; he argues that this is inef-
ficient and unfair to public shareholders.88 Professor Fischel cites 
one study showing that announcement of a plan of dual class capi-
talization does not diminish the price of publicly held stock.89 He 
seems to conclude that no federal regulation is needed.90 Thus, 
even if the SEC can prohibit dual class stock, it is unclear whether 
it should do so. This part of the Reply discusses the concept of 
efficiency in corporate law and procedural safeguards to limit dual 
class capitalization to situations in which it is efficient. Finally, 
this part provides a theoretical discussion of why dual class capi-
talization may be efficient in some cases. 
A. Efficiency and Unfairness 
Professor Seligman argues that dual class capitalization curtails 
the independence of outside directors and reduces management's 
incentives to satisfy public shareholders.91 This diminishes the 
"sense of managerial accountability,"92 and is both "inefficient ... 
and unfair to public shareholders."93 Any benefits from this ar-
rangement through increased job stability for managers can be 
better achieved through the executive job market.94 Accordingly, 
the SEC should prohibit dual class stock for section 12 
companies. 95 
Professor Fischel reaches very different conclusions. He finds 
legitimate business reasons for dual class stock and therefore 
would not prohibit it. 96 He also claims that the states and stock 
exchanges have strong incentives to impose voting rules that max-
imize investors' welfare and seems to deny that dual class stock is 
an abusive takeover defense.97 He concedes, however, that dual 
87. ·See infra text accompanying notes 189-97. 
88. Seligman, supra note 1, at 711-12, 724. 
89. D. FISCHEL, supra note 47, at 28-29 (citing M. Partch, The Issuance of Limited 
l
Common Stock and Shareholder Wealth (3rd Draft Sept. 1985) (Univ. of Oregon, Col-
ege of Bus. Admin.) 
90. See infra note 142. 
91. Seligman, supra note 1, at 721-24. 
92. Id. at 721. 
93. ld. at 724. 
94. Id. at 721. 
95. Id. at 724. 
96. D. FISCHEL, supra note 47, at 2-3, 6, 19-21, 25, 28-30, 34-35. 
t k97. See id. at 7-9, 31-33; infra note 142 (quoting Fischel on dual class stock as a 
a eover defense). 
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class stock may not be advisable in all cases. 98 As such, his report 
is ambiguous on whether some federal regulation of dual class 
stock short of total prohibition is desirable. 
One can quarrel with Professor Seligman's implication that the 
threat of takeovers always makes managers more efficient. He 
recognizes that managements of public companies often own a ma-
jority or near majority of their stock, although his analysis deems 
this inefficient because management is not threatened by take-
overs.99 Many commentators, most notably Professor Louis 
Lowenstein, contend that takeovers do not always replace less ef-
ficient managers with those who are more efficient.100 Many suc-
cessful raiders have not been well managed, and many of their 
targets have been well managed. Tax laws, rather than efficiency, 
often supply the incentive for takeovers.1°1 Rather than prodding 
managers, the threat of a takeover may distract and demoralize 
them.102 ·Other factors, such as stock ownership or compensation 
based on corporate performance, may motivate managers better 
than the threat of a takeover. 
Professor Seligman also has an unusual concept of efficiency 
and fairness. Actions of managers, except those involving seizure 
of corporate opportunities, are generally considered unfair to 
shareholders only if they reduce the value of the shareholders' in-
vestment. Efficiency requires managers to maximize the value of 
the firm.1°3 Although he does not say it explicitly, Professor Selig-
man's analysis depends on a different view - that dual class capi-
talization is "inefficient . . . and unfair to public shareholders" 
even if it increases their wealth.104 Admittedly, efficiency is not 
determined solely by the value of shares held by the public. Dual 
class stock could be inefficient, even if public shareholders prof-
ited by it, if it also diminished the value of other interests in the 
firm by a greater amount, thereby depressing the value of the 
firm. Professor Seligman does not suggest that this is likely, how-
ever. Thus, arguments for greater consideration of other corpo-
rate constituents such as creditors, employees, and 
communities containing corporate facilities - in connection with 
tender offers105 seem to be irrelevant in this context. Similarly, 
98. D. FISCHEL, supra note 47, at 14, 22, 23, 33. 
99. Seligman, supra note 1, at 707-10. 
100. See Lowenstein, Pruning Deadwood in Hostile Takeovers: A Proposal for Leg-
islation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 289-94, 305-06 (1983); see also Coffee, supra note 25, at 
1206-11. 
101. See Lowenstein, Management Buyouts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 730, 759-64 (1985). 
Although Professor Lowenstein's discussion concerns the tax benefits of management 
buyouts, most of the tax benefits described are also available in third-party takeovers. 
102. See Coffee, supra note 25, at 1234-43; infra text accompanying notes 159-64. 
103. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON. 395, 403-
06 (1983) (stating that shareholders have the exclusive right to vote because, as 
residual claimants to firm income, only they have "the appropriate incentives ... to 
make discretionary decisions" and "to maximize the wealth of the participants as a 
group"). 
104. See Seligman, supra note 1, at 724; see also id. at 723. 
105. See Mintz, Community DisZocations: A Painful Side Effect of Merger, Wash. 
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dual class capitalization increases efficiency, even if it reduces the 
value of publicly held shares, if it increases the value of the firm. 
Because other corporate constituents generally bargain for fixed 
retirrns, however, efficiency generally dictates maximizing the in-
terests of those entitled to residual income - the shareholders. 
Thus, efficiency and fairness are generally congruent goals. 
Do empirical data confirm the efficiency and fairness of dual 
class stock? Professor Seligman points to studies showing that in-
ferior voting stock trades· at a lower price.106 This no more proves 
inefficiency than would a showing that preferred stock or deben-
tures trade at a lower price. Different securities of a single firm 
usually trade at different prices; inefficiency exists only if a recap-
italization reduces the value of the firm. Professor Fischel cites 
one study showing that dual class recapitalizations have increased 
the value of public shares.107 This is not conclusive either. The 
study conflicts with preliminary findings by SEC Chief Economist 
Gregg Jarrell that such recapitalizations depreciate public 
shares.108 Moreover, Professor Fischel recognizes that, although 
the study he cites shows an aggregate net benefit to the public, 
public investors suffered losses in many of the cases studied.109 
Because some dual class recapitalizations generate gains for public 
investors and some generate losses, neither a total prohibition nor 
laissez-faire is ideal here. Rather, we must look more closely to 
separate the good from the bad, the sheep from the goats.ll0 
Post, Apr. 20, 1980, at A2, col. 1 (contending that takeovers often lead to plant closings 
and relocations, and arguing for government regulation of mergers likely to produce 
these effects); see also Coffee, supra note 25, at 1221-22. 
106. Seligman, supra note 1, at 711-12. 
107. D. FISCHEL, supra note 47, at 28-29 (citing M. Partch, The Issuance of Limited 
Common Stock and Shareholder Wealth (3rd Draft Sept.1985) (Univ. of Oregon, Col-
lege of Bus. Admin.)). Professor Seligman points out that Partch's study is of ques-
tionable value because of its "unusual sample group, with insiders controlling an 
average of 48.6% of the votes before the dual classification scheme is adopted." Selig-
man, supra note 1, at 712 n.107. The sample group may not be "unusual"; rather, dual 
class stock may be used primarily by companies with large insider holdings. Thus, the 
Jarrell study, infra note 108, may be more unusual in focusing on NYSE companies. 
If the NYSE and AMEX dropped their restrictions, however, companies with small 
insider holdings might adopt dual class stock more often, with results closer to those 
found by Jarrell than by Partch. 
108. G. Jarrell, The Stock Price Effects of NYSE Delisting for Violating Corporate 
Governance Rules (Dec. 5, 1984) (unpublished manuscript) (copy on file at the George 
Washington Law Review). Jarrell's study covered only five cases of dual class recapi-
talizations and since NYSE delisting was threatened in these cases, the threat could 
explain some or all of the losses. 
109. D. FISCHEL, supra note 47, at 14, 23, 33 (stating that shareholders can be, and 
often have been, harmed by dual class stock). 
110. See Matthew 25:32-33 (King James) ("And before him shall be gathered all 
~ations: and he shall separate them one from another, as a sheperd divideth his sheep 
lrforn the goats: And he shall set the sheep on his right hand, but the goats on the e t."). · 
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B. Separating Sheep from Goats in Dual Class Capitalization: 
Procedural Approaches 
A variety of procedures are used to install dual class stock. 
Each must be examined to gauge its effect on public shareholders. 
If a company is not publicly traded and consequently does not 
even have a market share price, adoption of dual class capitaliza-
tion will not reduce share price, and therefore will not injure pub-
lic shareholders. No public shareholders are injured because none 
exist. We may safely assume that insiders will not injure them-
selves; indeed, they may have good reasons to prefer dual class 
stock.111 The only possible objection is that purchasers in a subse-
quent public offering will suffer. Investors and their advisors, 
however, can. evaluate dual class voting rights as easily as they 
evaluate myriad other factors bearing on stock value. To disprove 
this, Professor Seligman must show that public issues in dual class 
arrangements tend to underperform the market. He makes no 
such showing, empirical or anecdotal; indeed, he concedes, indi-
rectly at least, the contrary.112 The arrangement is, therefore, 
unobjectionable. 
The distribution of a second class of stock as a dividend is simi-
larly irreproachable. Wang Laboratories did this to the benefit of 
public shareholders. The existing stock appreciated, and the new 
stock, with lower voting rights but a higher dividend, trades at a 
slight premium over the old stock.113 
Dual class capitalization could also result from an exchange of-
fer that each shareholder is free to accept or reject. Here again, 
management can take care of itself, and shareholders can assess 
the offer as well as they can assess any other exchange offer. An 
investor can be expected to consult a professional before respond-
ing to the offer.l14 Management, then, must propose a fair deal: if 
it offers stock with a reduced vote, it must add sufficient sweeten-
ers to make the stock attractive, or no one will take it. Recapitali-
zations through exchange offers have not been a particular 
problem since the adoption of the securities laws, and this kind of 
recapitalization poses no special problems. Even an unsophisti-
cated shareholder without professional advice can in effect rely on 
experts by selling into the market and letting arbitrageurs decide 
the value of the exchange offer. Insiders may prize voting power 
111. See infra text accompanying notes 161-82. 
112. Seligman, supra note 1, at 712 ("Some managers may have avoided dual class 
capitalization because they could raise more money from the sale of a single class of 
common stock with equal voting rights than in a dual class capitalization."). 
113. See id. at 704-05. Announcement of the Wang plan was "accompanied by a 
positive stock market reaction," though this may have been due in part to the simulta-
neous announcement of increased sales and earnings. G. Jarrell, supra note 108, at 21, 
app. 1, at 1; see also N.Y. Times, June 20, 1986, at D9, col. 6 (reporting the new Wang 
class B selling at a slight premium over class C). 
114. See Kripke, The SEC, the Accountants, Some Myths and Some Realities, 45 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1151, 1165 (1970) (stating that "the intelligent investor ... who tries to 
act in any informed way does so by getting at least part of his information second 
hand, filtered through professionals"). 
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more than other shareholders do115 and will therefore respond dif-
ferently to the offer, but this is unimportant if full disclosure is 
given and all shareholders have the same choices. 
A public company could offer the public new stock that bears 
voting rights different from the existing stock. This, too, is unex-
ceptionable. Potential investors can appraise the new stock as 
well as any other; they are no more likely to pay more than the 
stock merits than they would be in any other case. Nor would 
existing shareholders be injured. If they feel that the offering 
price of the new stock is too low, they can protect themselves by 
buying some of it, just as they could with a new issue of preferred 
stock or debentures. More important, the shareholders are pro-
tected by management's lack of any incentive to injure them. 
Management has no reason to offer the new stock to the public at 
an inadequate price or to use the new issue to injure the corpora-
tion otherwise. Management would have to be prevented from al-
lotting itself a disproportionate share of the new stock at an 
inadequate price, but this is nothing new. Management already 
has a temptation to issue itself shares of an existing or new class of 
stock or debt at an inadequate price. The law has handled this 
problem,116 and dual classes of common stock present no unique 
difficulties in this regard. 
To reject the foregoing transactions - dual class capitalization 
achieved through initial or secondary public offerings, dividends, 
or exchange offers - would raise implications reaching far be-
yond dual class stock. Professor Seligman suggests that inferior 
voting stock may not only trade at a discount from the moment of 
its issue, whether in a public offering or a later recapitalization, 
but that the gap may also widen thereafter.117 Underlying much 
of the current theory of corporate and securities law is the effi-
cient market hypothesis "which asserts that stock market prices 
react quickly and in an unbiased fashion to publicly availq.ble in-
formation."118 A corollary of this hypothesis is that, once 
115. See infra text accompanying notes 169-80 . 
. 116. To some extent this problem is handled through preemptive rights, which 
give shareholders a right to subscribe to a proportionate share of any new issue of 
stock. See H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS §§ 174-175 (3d ed. 
1983). Even when no preemptive right exists, fiduciary concepts may prohibit the sale 
of shares to insiders at an inadequate price. W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, CASES AND 
~TE~IALS ON CORPRATIONS 1076, 1089-1102 (5th ed. 1980). If the sale involves any 
ecepbon of minority shareholders, they could sue under rule 10b-5. See T. HAzEN, 
supra note 28, at 498-501. 
117. Seligman, supra note 1, at 721-22. 
U 118. See, e.g., Wang, Some Arguments that the Stock Market Is Not Efficient, 19 
.C. DAVIS L. REV. 341, 341-42 (1986). 
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absorbed, information cannot further influence security prices.llg 
Although some have disputed other aspects of the hypothesis,l2o 
few question this corollary. Thus, in questioning whether the 
market fully and quickly responds to dual class capitalization 
Professor Seligman questions, without explanation, an important 
tenet of corporate and securities law.121 Given the wide, uncon-
tested acceptance of the corollary, we should disregard Professor 
Seligman's agnosticism - at least until he justifies it. Further-
more, the philosophy of the federal securities laws is that invest-
ment decisions are best made by investors and their advisors after 
full disclosure.122 If investors are too foolish to evaluate dual class 
stock, they can hardly be wise enough to make other investment 
decisions, and the fundamental premise of the securities laws 
must be wrong. On the other hand, acceptance of these dual class 
stock transactions is consistent with this premise. 
Slightly more complicated is the issuance of a new class of stock 
not to the public but to third parties in a negotiated deal, such as a 
stock merger123 or an employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) or 
similar plan. The problem here is whether the third party is genu-
inely unaffiliated with management so that the transaction is at 
arm's length. Disputes already arise when management issues 
voting stock for allegedly inadequate consideration to an ESOP 
whose trustees are chosen by management.124 In such cases, man-
agement may place the shares in friendly hands expected to sup-
port management in a takeover fight. Because the problem 
already exists, use of a new issue of common stock arguably does 
119. See Kripke, A Search for Meaningful Securities Disclosure Policy, 31 Bus. 
LAw. 293, 311 (1975). 
120. See, e.g., Lowenstein, supra note 100, at 27 4-309 (questioning the validity of the 
efficient market hypothesis for takeovers). 
121. For example, if markets do not quickly absorb public information, we would 
have to question the SEC's integrated disclosure program, the use of market price to 
compute damages, portfolio theory, and so forth. The assumption of rapid absorption 
of information also underlies the broad acceptance of event studies. See D. FISCHEL, 
supra note 47, at 36; Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation 
Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225, 266 (1985). If Professor Seligman's implication is 
correct, event studies must be of little or no use. 
122. See 1 L. LOSS, SECURITIES REGULATION 122-28 (2d ed. 1961). This philosophy 
prevailed over arguments of those, such as Professor (later Justice) William Douglas, 
who believed that investors could not understand business disclosure. See Douglas, 
Protecting the Investor, 23 YALE REV. (n.s.) 521 (1934). 
123. General Motors created a special class of common stock with inferior voting 
rights for its acquisition of Electronic Data Systems Corporation. The inferior vote 
was justified on grounds of its lower dividend and other rights and, consequently, its 
lower value. General Motors also used inferior voting stock to acquire Hughes Air-
craft Company. See Brandow, The NYSE's One Sha·re/One Vote Rule, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 9, 
1985, at 33, col. 3; Coming to Blows Over One Share, One Vote, Bus. WK., July 8, 1985, 
at 81, 81-82; Sloan, Alphabet Soup, FoRBES, Apr. 21, 1986, at 33. 
124. See Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 265-66 (2d Cir. 1984) (en-
joining voting of stock issued to ESOP because evidence gave rise to strong inference 
that purpose of transaction was not to benefit the employees, but rather to solidify 
management's control of the company); Klaus v. Hi-Shear Corp., 528 F.2d 225, 233 (9th 
Cir. 1975) (refusing to enjoin voting of stock even though the plan was established to 
defeat talceover); Danaher Corp. v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 633 F. Supp. 1066, 
1070-74 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (denying injunction against stock plan); Podesta v. Calumet 
Indus., [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 11 96,433 (N.D. Ill. 1978). 
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not exacerbate the problem and so should not be barred. The dif-
ficulty of valuing a new issue of stock not publicly traded could, 
however, aggravate the already complicated problem of determin-
ing whether the transaction was fair to the corporation. 
Professor Seligman does not directly address whether regula-
tion by the states or the stock markets guarantees adequate pro-
tection of shareholders from victimization through dual class 
common stock. Nonetheless, by urging SEC action, he implies 
that the states and stock markets are not up to the task. Professor 
Fischel, in decrying accusations of a race to the bottom, proclaims 
a race to the top in which the states and stock markets compete to 
provide the most efficient regulation.125 In general, there is no 
race to the bottom; competition among the states has generally im-
proved corporate law.126 Pointless and detrimental restrictions 
have been shed, and competition among the stock markets has 
precipitated technological innovation and sharply lower brokerage 
commissions.127 Even exponents of this competition concede, 
however, that the states have not adequately policed takeover 
defenses.128 
Managers generally submit to efficient rules in order to attract 
investors. States and stock markets can facilitate this by providing 
a standard set of efficient rules and enforcement thereof; in return 
the states receive franchise fees, and the stock markets (or, more 
precisely, their members) receive commissions from trading in 
listed securities. However, if a company is already publicly traded 
and does not need to raise more capital from public stock offer-
ings, the managers may prefer rules that favor themselves over 
public shareholders. Because managers choose the market for 
trading, the stock markets will cater to the managers' prefer-
ences~129 Takeovers so threaten managers that they will take 
steps contrary to shareholder interests to thwart them. Dual class 
stock may serve legitimate purposes, but it may also thwart take-
overs. The states and stock markets cannot be expected to pre-
vent this any more than they have prevented other takeover 
125. D. FISCHEL, supra note 47, at 7-17. 
126. See Manning, Thinking Straight About Corporate Law Reform, 41 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 17 (Summer 1977); see also D. FISCHEL, supra note 47, at 11 and 
authorities cited at 11 n.14. 
127. See Wayne, The Big Board's Fight to Stay on Top, N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1984, 
§ 3, at 1, col. 2 (competition has compelled the NYSE to adopt new technology). 
128. See Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Re-
sponding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARv. L. REV. 1161, 1174-82 (1981) (criticizing all take-
over defenses and advocating a rule of target management passivity). 
129. The managers' desire to shift the state of incorporation is subject to share-
holder approval, but this provides little protection for shareholders. See infra text 
accompanying notes 147-52. 
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defenses.130 
Professor Fischel argues that an exchange will not permit abuse 
of shareholders because it would lose listings and commissions 
based on share price.131 But managers prefer reduced investor 
confidence and share price to a takeover and will list their compa-
nies for trading on an exchange that permits them to avoid the 
unemployment line.132 The exchanges will sacrifice far less in 
commissions from reduced share price than they would from loss 
of listings.133 
The most perplexing question is whether shareholder approval 
alone should suffice to authorize dual class capitalization.I34 
Shareholders must approve a charter amendment before any dual 
class recapitalization can be instituted.135 In many cases the recap-
italization requires for its implementation further steps, such as a 
secondary public offering or an exchange offer, that will automati-
cally protect public shareholders.136 In other cases this will not be 
true, so a proxy vote will offer the only shareholder protection. 
For example, often management seeks shareholder approval for a 
charter amendment authorizing new stock with superior voting 
rightsP7 Although not specified in the proxy solicitation, man-
agement generally plans to issue the new stock to itself or friends. 
Nor is it disclosed that these transactions generally damage share 
values because they obstruct potential raiders and thereby reduce 
the chance that shareholders will receive a takeover premium.l3s 
As a result, shareholders do not get a full picture of what they are 
approving. Moreover, shareholder approval often means little be-
cause management controls the proxy mechanism and owns many 
shares.139 
As an alternative, management can orchestrate a charter revi-
sion that assigns different votes to shares of a single class depend-
ing on the identity of the holder. Some companies have provided 
that a purchaser of stock has one vote per share until he has held 
the stock for forty-eight consecutive months, after which he has 
ten votes per share.140 A company could also set a ceiling on the 
130. On occasion, state courts will prevent gross abuses, including abuses of dual 
class stock. See Packer v. Yarnpol, No. 8432 (Del. Ch. Apr. 18, 1986). 
131. D. FISCHEL, supra note 47, at 12. 
132. It is widely accepted that the pressure on the NYSE to permit dual class stock 
ha.::; come from corporate managers who want to adopt it as a takeover defense. See 
Karmel, One Share, One Vote, supra note 50, at 2, col. 1; Wayne, supra note 127, at 12, 
col. 2. 
133. Commissions are determined more by number of shares than by share price. 
Certainly, price declines on the order found by Jarrell, see supra note 108 and accom-
panying text, would not noticeably reduce commissions. 
134. See Seligman, supra note 1, at 721-22. 
135. The corporate charter must state the number of shares of each class author-
ized, and shareholder approval is required to amend the charter. H. HENN & J. ALEX-
ANDER, supra note 116, §§ 123, 345. 
136. See supra text accompanying notes 114-16. 
137. See Brandow, supra note 123, at 47, col. 3. 
138. See Seligman, supra note 1, at 7:1.0-12. 
139. See infra text accompanying notes 189-91. 
140. See Brandow, supra note 123, at 47, col. 3. 
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number of votes any shareholder may cast. To circumvent share-
holder resistance, some managers are now seeking state laws that 
would limit the votes a raider could exercise.141 
Dual class capitalization can injure shareholders in several 
ways.142 Granting management extra votes can render a hostile 
takeover either mathematically impossible or prohibitively expen-
sive. This not only precludes any takeover premium for the share-
holders, but also reduces the discipline that the threat of 
takeovers exerts on management.143 Similarly, management's ex-
tra votes may eliminate independent directors' ability to discipline 
inefficient managers.144 Even if a takeover occurs, management 
can use its superior vote to grab much of the premium from public 
shareholders for itsel£.145 Unlike dual class stock issued in a pub-
lic offering, dual class stock instituted by shareholder vote is not 
already discounted by the market, so shareholders are not 
estopped to complain when it is instituted.146 
141. See 1985 Wis. Laws 195, § 6 (codified at Wrs. STAT. ANN. § 180.25(9)(a) (West 
1957 & Supp. 1986)) (providing that any person owning "in excess of 20% of the voting 
power in the election of directors shall be limited to 10% of the full voting power of 
those shares"; but the statute contains so many exceptions that it applies in effect only 
to raiders). 
142. Professor Fischel states that "[t]he argument that dual class co=on stock is 
an abusive .defensive tactic used to defeat takeovers is also flawed" and that "[t]o 
equate dual class co=on stock with defensive tactics in response to takeovers ... is 
misleading .... " D. FiscHEL, supra note 47, at 3, 32-33. Ironically, he also concedes 
that "[d]ual class co=on stock ... makes transfers of control more difficult" and 
that "[t]hose with voting control ... may anticipate a premium price for those shares 
in the event of a takeover bid." Id. at 19, 27. 
143. The latter effect is not entirely negative. See infra text accompanying notes 
159-64. 
144. See DeAngelo & DeAngelo, Managerial Ownership of Voting Rights, 14 .J. 
FIN. ECON. 33, 36 (1985). 
145. Both management's sale of super-voting stock to itself and the agreement by 
managers to take an extra premium for that stock in a takeover could be attacked by 
minority shareholders as self-dealing and a breach of the duty of loyalty. Although 
these suits are not necessarily doomed to failure, experience to date gives little cause 
for optimism. At the least, a shareholder attacking such a transaction must, if it was 
approved by disinterested directors, bear the burden of proving it unfair to the corpo-
ration, and in many states he must prove fraud or bad faith. H. HENN & .J. ALEXAN-
DER, supra note 116, § 238. Moreover, the mere authorization of dual class stock by 
charter amendment may discourage bidders, and this involves no self-dealing by insid-
ers. The cases have generally permitted these takeover defenses. See Coffee, supra 
note 24, at 1147 n.2, 1251 n.319. 
146. It is argued above that dual class stock issued in an initial or secondary public 
offering is w1objectionable because investors know what they are getting and get what 
they pay for. See supra text accompanying notes 111-12 & 116. It could be argued that 
whenever an investor buys stock he knows that a later dual class recapitalization may 
occur, that he discounts for this possibility, and therefore he cannot complain if it 
occurs. This argument is factually faulty; dual class stock was rare until recently and 
Was prohibited by the NYSE. Investors did not have reason to anticipate it; nor do 
they have reason to anticipate it now, as shown by the frequent share-price declines 
"-:hen dual class stock is adopted. See supra note 108. More important, if a contrary 
V1ew were taken, companies would be forced to take special measures to promise. not 
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Professor Seligman disparages shareholder approval as a Pr 
phylactic because "management has immense funding advantag~­
in ... a proxy contest" and lacks "organized opposition."l47 Pro~ 
fessor Fischel at least indirectly endorses shareholder approval a 
a prophylactic.148 Both positions are incongruous because Profes~ 
sor Seligman elsewhere champions corporate suffrage;149 Profes-
sor Fischel deprecates it, characterizing shareholders as 
apathetic.150 Skepticism about shareholder voting is justified 
Professors Frank Easterbrook and Fischel properly argue that 
shareholders devote little attention to proxies because each share. 
holder, owning only a fraction of the stock, would gain only a frac-
tion of the benefit to the corporation of a correct vote. Because his 
vote will not affect the outcome, the rational investment by most 
shareholders in information on proxy issues is zero.151 Because 
shareholders generally trust management (or they would not re-
tain their stock), most follow the Wall Street rule -vote with 
management or sell. Professor Fischel claims, however, that apa-
thy disappears in contests for corporate controU52 Even if he is 
right, clever management will install dual class stock long before a 
contest begins, thereby insuring that none ever will begin. 
But why allow shareholder approval at all? To justify allowing 
such approval, it must be shown that dual class capitalization may 
be efficient and that it may increase shareholder wealth. 
C. A Theoretical Justification of the Efficiency of Dual 
Class Capitalization 
A skeptic may well point out that the preceding discussion advo-
cates only procedural safeguards. Even if the argument is superfi-
cially appealing, it gives no theory of why dual class capitalization 
may increase wealth. Without such a theory, one may doubt that 
any procedure, even if apparently fair, will generate fair and effi-
cient results. 
The very commonness of dual class stock and substitute ar-
rangements suggests their utility. Shareholders often divide vat-
to adopt dual class capitalization if they wanted to obtain a maximum price when 
issuing stock. Because corporate law is most efficient when viewed as a standard set 
of efficient rules, see Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 V AND. L. REV. 
1259, 1264 (1982), it would be most efficient for the law to regulate dual class recapital-
izations to prevent those that diminish share value. 
147. Seligman, supra note 1, at 723-24. 
148. "[T]he creation of dual class common stock is typically accompanied by proce-
dural safeguards (such as a requirement of shareholder approval) that protect share-
holders." D. FISCHEL, supra note 47, at 3; see also id. at 29, 33. 
149. See Seligman, supra note 1, at 717-18. 
150. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 103, at 395 ("Shareholders are apathetic in 
the best of times."). Ironically, Professor Fischel makes the same point in his study of 
dual class stock. See D. FISCHEL, supra note 47, at 17 (stating that "voting is a very 
imperfect monitoring mechanism"); id. at 19 (stating that "the collective action prob-
lem faced by dispersed shareholders ensures that voting will be relatively ineffective 
as a monitoring mechanism"). 
151. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 103, at 402; see also supra note 150. 
152. D. FiscHEL, supra note 47, at 18. 
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ing power and right to profits differently, particularly in close 
corporations. For example, a minority shareholder may obtain 
board representation or even a >Yeto over corporate actions 
through different classes of stock or through some substitute, such 
as a voting trust or pooling agreement. Similarly, a participant 
(not necessarily even a shareholder) may obtain a share of the 
cash flow larger than his voting rights. 
Even without dual class stock or some substitute, the congru-
ency of voting power and share of profits is more illusory than 
real. If one shareholder owns 51% of the stock, the minority 
shareholders in effect have no vote, even though they are entitled 
to nearly half of the profits. Professor Seligman's analysis sug-
gests that this is inefficient because managers are not subject to 
the discipline of takeovers.153 In seeming contradiction, however, 
he recognizes that dual class stock is not more common only be-
cause management of many public companies owns over or nearly 
half of the stock. As such, dual classes are unnecessary.154 Thus, 
even in public companies, exposure to takeovers is more the ex-
ception than the rule.155 At the same time, holders of securities 
with equity features (such as warrants and convertible securities) 
have a keen interest in profits, but no vote.156 If these disparities 
are neither inefficient nor illegal, dual class stock should not be 
either. If Professor Seligman opposes dual class capitalization, he 
should also oppose majority stock ownership by management of 
public companies and the issuance of securities with equity fea-
tures but no vote. He neither takes this position nor distinguishes 
these situations from dual class capitalization. 
Even the NYSE's opposition to dual class stock is misleading. 
The NYSE has always permitted dual classes if their voting power 
is "in reasonable relationship to the equity interests."157 Professor 
Seligman's proposed prohibition would apparently prevent even 
153. Seligman, supra note 1, at 721-22. 
154. Id. at 707-10. 
155. In addition to companies in which management owns a controlling block, 
some companies are so large as to be immune to takeover. The growing financial 
~apabilities of raiders have whittled down the number of companies enjoying such 
!Irununity, but clearly some number of the largest remain invulnerable. 
156. Similarly, preferred stock sometimes does have voting rights. Although rea-
sonable people could disagree over which approach is better, Professor Seligman's ~alysis seems to suggest that only one structure of voting and earnings rights is effi-
Cie~t and that all others must be forbidden. It would follow that voting rights for 
Pre erred stock should be either forbidden or mandated, but not discretionary. 
r 
15!· NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE LISTED COMPANY MANuAL § 313.00(D) (1983), 
8epnn_ted in Impact of Corporate Takeovers: Hearings Before the Sub.comm. on 
1 e;:urtties of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban .Affairs, 99th Cong., ~~~ss. 1141 (1985) [hereinafter Corporate Takovers Hearings]. The directors of the 
have now voted to repeal this rule. See supra note 39. 
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dual class stock of this kind, although there is no evident reason t 
"t 0 oppose 1. 
Although the foregoing suggests that dual class capitalizati 
may be efficient, it does not show why. It does not help to state: 
does Professor Fischel, that "insiders may simply value control 
more than outsiders."158 This reasoning merely forces us to re-
state the question: Why do insiders value control more? There 
are several plausible reasons. 
First, Professor Seligman argues that dual class capitalization is 
undesirable because it deters or prevents tender offers - the 
threat of which makes management more efficient.159 Although 
there is some truth in this, there are also problems With it. Take-
overs do not always result in more efficient managers replacing 
less efficient managers.160 The threat of a takeover may distract 
management rather than prod its efforts.161 For example, man-
agement fearing a takeover may have to justify its business plans 
to uninformed shareholders and outside directors. Failure to do so 
produces an asymmetry of information between managers and in-
vestors that may diminish the company's stock price,162 and 
thereby induce a takeover, even though management's plans are 
sound. Fear of this result may prompt managers to forego plans 
that they believe are profitable but cannot be adequately ex-
plained to shareholders because, for example, the relevant infor-
mation is too expensive to verify or to disclose to the public, or 
because management's plans involve business secrets.163 Many 
business people and commentators believe that for these reasons 
managers often stress short-term performance at the expense of 
long-range planning.164 Thus, dual class capitalization may facili-
tate long-range planning. Management can be disciplined by 
other means, such as compensation tied to corporate 
performance.165 
Dual class stock may also help to overcome a market flaw that 
may arise when a company goes public. The power to control a 
corporation carries a value independent of the right to cash flow 
contained in the stock; thus, a controlling block of stock usually 
158. D. FISCHEL, supra note 47, at 19. 
159. Seligman, supra note 1, at 721-22. 
160. See supra text accompanying notes 99-101. 
161. See Coffee, supra note 25, at 1196 (the market may not appreciate manage-
ment's efforts); id. at 1232-33 ("internal monitoring should ordinarily outperform ex-
temal monitoring"); id. at 1238-43 (the threat of takeover may demoralize 
management); id. at 1243-50 (the threat of takeovers may induce management to in-
cur excessive risk). 
162. See Myers, The Capital Structure Puzzle, 39 J. FIN. 575, 582-85 (1984) (sug-
gesting that asymmetric information diminishes the price at which a corporation can 
sell its securities, especially equity securities). 
163. See DeAngelo & DeAngelo, supra note 144, at 35. 
164. See Altman & Brown, Ridding Wall Street of a Short-Term Bias, N.Y. Times, 
June 1, 1986, § 3, at 3, col. 1. 
165. See Murphy, Corporate Performance and Managerial Remuneration: An Em-
pirical Analysis, 7 J. AccT. & EcoN. 11, 13 (1985) (finding that "corporate perform-
ance ... is strongly and positively related to managerial remuneration"). 
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commands a so-called control premium.166 But when a company's 
stock is widely scattered among the public, control does not attach 
to anyone's stock; no purchaser will pay a control premium for 
any block of stock because no block possesses control.167 Conse-
quently, when a close corporation sells most of its voting stock to 
the public, management does not so much sell control as fritter it 
away, because it sells a majority of its stock but receives no control 
premium for it. 
One way to avoid this is simply to keep a majority of the stock in 
management rather than selling it to the public. This may be un-
desirable because it would force management either to invest all 
its limited wealth in the company, thereby becoming dangerously 
undiversified (i.e., putting all its eggs in one basket), or to limit the 
capital it raises, thereby denying the company profitable opportu-
nities.168 A better solution is dual class stock. By selling stock en-
titled to most of the cash flow without surrendering control, 
management can raise needed capital without either becoming un-
diversified or frittering away the control premium. This solution 
is also efficient. Managers prize their votes, but as shown, public 
investors do not because their few shares will not affect share-
holder votes.169 Thus, a dual class arrangement can allocate votes 
to those who value them most, thereby maximizing the total value 
of the company's stock. 
Further, dual class capitalization encourages managers to make 
166. See H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 116, § 241, at 657 . 
. 167. The public investor who buys 100 shares fully realizes that he is not purchas-
m? part of control in the usual sense. The only sense in which he controls is that a 
r~der may offer a premium for his shares, because by pooling many small blocks the 
~a:tder can put- together a controlling block. But a takeover bid is uncertain and, even 
one does occur, its price and success are also uncertain. Shareholders cannot as-
~ume tha~ any substantial departure (whether accidental or venal) by management 
rom profit maximization will trigger a takeover. The costs of a takeover- including 
~e~ch, premium, and the possibility of succumbing to a superior bid (most first bids 
Tail) - are so high that only the grossest incompetence can by itself attract a raider. 
arget management can raise these costs and possibly defeat the raid with defensive 
maneuvers. More important, the incompetence of target management is only one of 
~7~eral major factors precipitating tender offers. Others are empire building by the 
th t.r• see Coffee, supra note 25, at 1167-69, the potential fit between the target and b'~d ldder, the vulnerability of the target, and the tax benefits of the takeover to the 
v~ er. f ~us, although the possibility of a tender offer will be a component in the 
actu~ 0 VIrtually any widely held company, that component will be smaller than the 
u value of control itself. 
h 16~· Sr;e ?eAngelo & DeAngelo, supra note 144, at 52 (stating that limited wealth m~~ hes1s lS plausible because, in sample group of companies with dual class stock, 
169an company value exceeded $88 million); Seligman, supra note 1, at 721-22. s2. TW Shareholders are generally apathetic. See supra text accompanying notes 147-
ing h s does not mean that public shareholders consider voting rights worthless; vat-
at 7~1-~es do trade. at a premium over nonvoting shares. See Seligman, supra note 1, 
contr 1 
2
·T B~t pubhc shareholders value these rights less than those who have or seek 
manao · his largely explains the premiums in tender offers, see supra note 167, and 
gement buyouts. 
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a personal commitment to the company or, as economists put it tl. ..\ .· 
invest firm-specific human capital in the company.11o A host'lo 
takeover can result in the firing of managers who have redu 1 ~ / 
the market value of their services by acquiring skills valuabl:~ 
only one firm. 171 Takeover threats can force managers to lea 0 ! 
firms for new positions that are less desirable except for the neve j 
firm's insulation from takeover risks, e.g., because the new e:. I 
player is privately owned.172 If the managers remain, the threat of 
a takeover may exact a psychological toll from them.l73 , 
A successful raider could retain an effective incumbent manage. 
ment. Indeed, one might argue that because the raider has an in-
centive to do so, only incompetent management would try to 
entrench itself with dual class capitalization. However, several 
factors work against the raider's retaining even effective manag-
ers. The incumbents' primary functions of strategic planning and 
budgeting tend to become redundant once there is a new control-
ling shareholder.174 Takeover fights often breed enmity that pre-
vents cooperation between old and new management. Finally, 
control has psychological benefits - feelings of worth, fulfillment 
' and such - that the incumbents lose in a takeover and for which 
the raider has no reason to reimburse them. Thus, a hostile take-
over usually results in displacement of even effective managers, 
and the costs of this displacement go uncompensated. 
Several devices can limit or eliminate the risk of management 
displacement. One is the golden parachute, which compensates 
the manager displaced by a hostile takeover.175 Another device is 
dual class capitalization; it discourages or prevents hostile take-
overs, thereby enabling the firm to retain valued managers and to 
assign them tasks they might otherwise refuse because of concern 
for the job market. 
Finally, dual class capitalization may overcome the inefficiency 
that arises from managers having a smaller share of voting rights 
than of cash flow. Easterbrook and Fischel have argued that it is 
efficient for participants in the firm to have equal shares of voting 
rights and cash flow; they therefore support the rule of one share, 
one vote.176 They argue that "[a]s the residual claimants, the 
shareholders are the group with the appropriate incentives (col-
lective choice problems to one side) to make discretionary deci-
170. See D. FISCHEL, supra note 47, at 20; DeAngelo & DeAngelo, supra note 144, at 
36. 
171. See Coffee, supra note 25, at 1234-50. 
172. See id. at 1237. 
173. Shareholders may be indifferent to this psychological toll on managers so long 
as it does not impair profits. Eliminating this toll could, however, be more of a benefit 
to managers than the corresponding detriment to shareholders. If so, managers 
should be willing to compensate shareholders for their loss. See supra text accompa-
nying notes 68-69. 
174. Coffee, supra note 25, at 1236. 
175. See id. at 1263-64. 
176. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 103, at 403-06, 409-10. 
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sions."177 Their reasoning is sound, and it supports their 
conclusion in most, but not all, cases. If certain participants have a 
claim on residual cash flow larger than their share of votes, ineffi-
ciency would result. Reallocation of votes to remove the disparity 
would then be efficient, and dual class capitalization can achieve 
this. Common stock does not possess the only claims on residual 
income. Managers also have such claims through bonuses, stock 
appreciation rights, and other forms of compensation based on cor-
porate performance. Salaries, pensions, and perquisites might also 
be added to this list to the extent that they exceed what the man-
ager could obtain elsewhere in the job market.178 But these claims 
carry no vote. If dual class capitalization merely raises the manag-
ers' voting rights to the same level as their claims to residual cash 
flow, it would enhance efficiency. 
Professor Fischel argues that insider control - and, by implica-
tion, dual class capitalization - "may allow shareholders of a tar-
get corporation to obtain a higher price when a transfer of control 
does occur"; insider control may permit insiders to negotiate for 
shareholders, who "are unable to act collectively."179 Although 
this possibility exists, it also has a dark side; managers may use 
control to grab most or all of the control premium for them-
selves.180 If the extra premium for management only matches its 
share of residual income, it is unobjectionable. If dual class stock 
originated when the company went public or in a later exchange 
offer, public shareholders either never paid for the control pre-
mium or agreed for consideration to surrender it. Again, public 
shareholders could not complain. But shareholders could justly 
177. I d. at 403. But see Ratner, The Government of Business Corporations: Critical 
Reflections on the Rule of "One Share, One Vote," 56 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1970) (argu-
ing that it might be better to limit the number of votes of large shareholders). 
178. One problem is to distinguish payments that are residual from those that are 
not. To some extent all claims on corporate cash flow vary with profits, or are 
residual. Employees may be able to bargain for higher wages if the corporation is 
Profitable, and creditors may not be fully paid if the corporation becomes insolvent. 
~et n~i~her employees nor creditors have voting rights; their rights are protected by 
argauung and competition. Managers have similar protections, but these may be in-
adequate because of imperfections in the executive job market. See Coffee, supra 
~ate 25, at 1235-38; supra text accompanying notes 170-74. Moreover, the compensa-
hln of managers varies more with corporate performance than do the claims of em-
P oyees and creditors. 
179. D. FISCHEL, supra note 47, at 21. 
180. Professor Fischel recognizes this possibility. Id. at 27. The legality of such a 
~aneuver is unclear. In general, controlling shareholders may legally sell their 
8 ares for a premium. See H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 116, § 241, at 657. ~~wever, in special circumstances they may not. See Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 
R (2d Cir. 1955); Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 1 Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. 
ptr. 592 (1969). Because courts have not clearly defined what constitutes special cir-
hUlllstances, and because cases involving sale of superior voting stock for a premium 
ave rarely occurred, it is impossible to predict how courts will treat such sales. 
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complain if insiders grabbed most or all of the control pre . 
without having given adequate consideration for the superio!UiUrn 
ing stock. Professor Fischel should recognize this. r Vot. 
Professor Seligman correctly argues that dual class capital' 
tion does not always enhance efficiency. Nonetheless, one rn IZa-
beware of the Nirvana fallacy - the belief that if some flaw can ~t 
found in a state of affairs, some better state of affairs must be p e 
sible.181 Dual. class capitalization must .be compared to the av:: 
able alternatives, not to an unobtrunable ideal. Dual clas 
c~p~talization can thwart unsolicited takeovers, but if it were pro~ 
hib1ted, management would seek other defenses. A universal pro. 
hibition against takeover defenses would be impo~sible because 
many defenses, such as mergers, employee stock ownership plans 
and entry into regulated industries, also serve legitimate busines~ 
purposes .. The law cannot prohibit these.182 Prohibiting some de. 
fenses would only increase the use of defenses not prohibited. 
Takeover defenses are hard to factor into the equation. Clearly 
we should not surrender and allow management to do anything, 
however outrageous, to thwart tender offers; but we should at 
least be chary of barring defenses to tender offers if their ineffi-
ciency is not manifest. The linkage between dual class stock and 
other tender offer defenses is important, however. If the most 
abusive defenses, such as poison pills, lock ups, and greenmail, 
were barred, the probability of tender offers would rise, and with 
it would rise the control component of stock value representing 
that probability. The price gap between stocks with and without 
takeover potential would increase. Management would have to of-
fer more attractive packages to induce shareholders to adopt dual 
class stock, and the creation of dual class capitalization by public 
offering would be more costly in that the discount for stock with 
inferior voting rights (which would be less attractive to a raider) 
would be greater. Thus, limiting tender offer defenses would also 
compel managers to make dual class stock more appealing to pub-
lic shareholders. 
In sum, dual class capitalization may or may not enhance effi-
ciency, depending on the circumsta11ces. The problem is to sepa-
rate the sheep from the goats, to distinguish efficiency-enhancing 
from efficiency-impairing situations. 
III. A Counterproposal 
Professor Seligman is wrong to advocate total prohibition of 
dual class capitalization, but neither is laissez-faire ideal here. 
The challenge lies in finding the golden mean. The ideal approach 
would be the most efficient, which means permitting managers to 
181. Easterbrook, Breaking Up Is Hard To Do, REGULATION, Nov.-Dec. 1981, at 26. 
182. See Dent, Unprofitable Mergers: Toward a Market-Based Legal Response, 80 
Nw. U.L. REV. 777 (1986) (potential targets can deter raiders by making acquisitions, 
but no one advocates prohibiting this defensive maneuver). 
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do as they please so long as they do not impair the interests of 
public shareholders. One possible approach would permit manag-
ers to conduct the procedures for instituting dual class stock, but 
would enjoin the change if it caused a decline in the price of public 
shares. Although this approach has much to recommend it, it also 
has some shortcomings.1sa 
The NYSE's proposal would require approval of a majority of 
both independent directors and independent shareholders.184 One 
problem with this approach is that it would apply only to NYSE-
listed companies. But even if adopted by the AMEX and N AS-
DAQ as well, or imposed by the SEC, this approach would create 
problems. First, it would require shareholder approval for many 
transactions, such as secondary public offerings and exchange of-
fers, that pose no threat. In most of these cases shareholder ap-
proval could be readily obtained, however, so that the only 
detriment would be the cost of a proxy solicitation. Further, the 
NYSE's proposal would not alter the inadequate disclosure in dual 
class recapitalizations.185 It is not clear whether the proposal 
would even apply to some dual class schemes.186 Most important, 
because of shareholder apathy, a majority vote of independent 
shareholders would not protect them.187 
Many procedures require no new regulation because they pose 
no threat to shareholders. Thus, dual class capitalization adopted 
prior to going public or accomplished through an exchange offer 
or secondary public offering should be permitted. 
As to shareholder votes, the SEC may be able to handle them by 
requiring additional proxy disclosure. Although shareholders 
often approve proposals detrimental to their interests, "including· 
dual class recapitalizations, shareholders have grown warier of 
shark repellants188 and will probably reject them even more fre-
183. See id. (advocating such a solution to the problem of unprofitable corporate 
acquisitions). Applied to dual class stock, this solution would have much greater 
Problems than if applied to corporate acquisitions. The attraction of dual class stock 
as a takeover defense makes it even less likely that states would apply it to corporate 
acquisitions than to mergers. Problems of timing would be more acute. Management 
c~ stretch announcement and implementation of the recapitalization over a long pe-
nod, thereby minimizing the impact of any single announcement. At the federal 
lev:l! this approach would also depart radically from the traditions of the federal se-
curities laws. An approach more in keeping with these traditions would be 
Preferable. 
184. NYSE Press Release, supra note 39. 
185. See supra text accompanying notes 137-38. 
186. The proposal refers to "a class or classes of common stock having more than 
~ne vote per share." NYSE, Proposed Rules Changes by New York Stock Exchange, 
nc., SEC form 19b-4, file no. SR-NYSE 86-17, at 25 (Sept. 16, 1986). It is not clear 
whether this would include schemes varying the voting rights of a single class. See 
supra text accompanying notes 140-41. 
187. See supra text accompanying notes 151-52. 
188. See Gilson, The Case Against Shark Repellant Amendments: Structural Limi-
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quently in the future than they do now. The SEC can pr 
this laudable trend by requiring full disclosure of the pr~:-~~e 
consequences of adopting dual class capitalization or other 8~ ~ 
repellants. For e:x:ampl~, the SEC c~uld require issuers see~ 
approval of superiOr votmg stock to disclose prominently that th g 
new stock may be sold to insiders at less than its market value~ 
that other shareholders may be excluded from purchasing it· th · t 
t~e very autho~ization of t?e new stock may discourage pot~nti~ 
b1dders who nnght otherWise offer a larger premium for the corn. 
mon shares; that approval will probably cause the value of existin 
shares to decline; and that insiders may use the superior voting 
stock to thwart a takeover or to divert much of the control pre~ 
mium to themselves. 
Although such disclosures could help, they cannot completely 
solve the problem for several reasons. First, insiders have virtu-
ally unlimited access to the corporate treasury for proxy solicita-
tions and can partly offset candid disclosures by intensifying their 
solicitations. They may even pressure large institutional share-
holders to vote with them.189 Second, in many cases insiders own 
a large portion of the stock, and state law permits them to vote 
even in matters in which they have a personal interest.l9o Third, if 
differential voting rights are instituted by state law,l91 the share-
holders' views will become irrelevant. 
Accordingly, Congress should prohibit the creation or sale by 
public companies of stock with disproportionate voting rights, 
whether by the issue of a new class of stock or by revising the 
voting rights of existing shares,l92 unless approved by a majority of 
disinterested shareholders. However, Congress should recognize 
an exception for the sale of shares to nonaffiliates, including an 
offering to the public or pro rata to all shareholders, in an arm's-
length transaction. The SEC would be authorized to define such 
vague terms as arm's-length transaction, nonaffiliate, and disinter-
tations on the Enabling Concept, 34 STAN. L. REV. 775, 826-27 (1982) (recognizing the 
large and growing opposition to shark repellants among institutional investors). 
189. See Pickens, Second-Class Stock Impairs Market, Wall St. J., Feb. 13, 1986, at 
30, col. 3; see also DeAngelo & Rice, Antitakeover Charter Amendments and Stock-
holder Wealth, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 329, 334 (1983) (stating that institutional shareholders 
may support detrimental proposals "to maintain a working relationship with incum-
bent management"). 
190. In the study by Partch, insiders owned an average of 48.6% of the votes. See 
D. FISCHEL, supra note 47, at 28-29. No state prohibits interested shareholders from 
voting. Directors are even permitted by many courts to vote as shareholders to ratify 
their own actions. See H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 116, § 194, at 516. 
191. See supra text accompanying note 141. 
192. Somewhat different issues are posed by providing a greater vote for shares 
held for a long time. See supra notes 140-41. By discouraging raiders and arbitrageurs 
(and perhaps even large institutional investors), such provisions should diminish 
share price. Perhaps we can rely on shareholders to vote down such provisions. Such 
provisions, however, serve no valid purpose; any legitimate function of dual class 
stock can be better achieved by other approaches. Therefore, such provisions should 
be prohibited by federal law. 
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ested shareholders.193 Such a law would override any state law to 
the contrary. The SEC could then demand disclosure of the iden-
tity of the proposed purchasers, the terms of sale, and perhaps 
opinions of the likely effect of the transaction on the value of pub-
lic shares.194 
This approach would leave corporations free, without share-
holder approval, to adopt dual class stock before going public; to 
sell disproportionate voting stock to the public; to make an ex-
change offer of disproportionate voting stock to all shareholders; 
and to use disproportionate voting stock to make arm's-length ac-
quisitions. Displacement of state law would be limited to requir-
ing shareholder approval in certain other cases. Although such 
requirements are rare in the federal securities laws, they are not 
unheard of.195 They are broadly consistent with the securities 
laws' emphasis on corporate suffrage and investor discretion as op-
posed to substantive regulation. As in other areas under the fed-
eral securities laws, shareholder-investors may make decisions 
that prove self-injurious, but on balance they will outdo a govern-
ment agency in deciding what is in their best interests.196 
This approach also surpasses the laissez-faire approach that Pro-
fessor Fischel seems to prefer. The costs of requiring sharehold-
ers' approval are fairly small, and shareholders are unlikely to 
reject a proposal beneficial to them. Professor Fischel even 
praises shareholder review of dual class recapitalizations.197 The 
proposal suggested in this Reply only ensures that such review is 
granted to disinterested shareholders, with full disclosure, for 
each important step of the recapitalization. 
Conclusion 
Professor Seligman has impressively recounted the history of 
dual class capitalization and its regulation, but his reading of the 
SEC's power to regulate it is faulty. His analysis of the effects of 
dual class stock is also flawed, as is Professor Fischel's. Although 
the former errs in over looking the possible benefits of dual class 
193. Perhaps the SEC should have authority to regulate voting by interested share-
holders of public companies in other situations, too. This proposal, however, is limited 
to dual class stock. 
194. See Rule 13e-100, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100 (1985) (requiring management to dis-
close opinions on the fairness of proposed going private transactions). The SEC could 
r_equire the issuer to obtain an independent opinion of the likely effect of the transac-
tion on the value of public shares, or to disclose opinions prepared by qualified per-
sons at the request of shareholders. 
195. See Investment Company Act of 1940, § 15(a), 15 U.S. C. § 80a-15(a) (1982) (re-
quiring shareholder approval of advisers' contracts with investment companies). 
196. See supra text accompanying note 122. 
197. See D. FISCHEL, supra note 47, at 3, 28-29, 33. 
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stock, the latter is blind to its detriments. This Reply has mapped 
out a middle path that draws on traditional approaches of the 
federal securities laws to minimize the dangers of dual class 
capitalization while preserving its benefits. 
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